Presentations to NATO - 2014

 

The Fisher Institute at NATO's Annual Joint Airpower Competence Center Conference

Brig. General (Ret.) Efraim Segoli, Head of the Airpower and Asymmetric Conflict Center of the Fisher Institute was invited by NATO to give two presentations to two different groups at a special conference held at the Joint Airpower Competence Center (JAPCC) in Kleve, Germany.

 

The JAPCC -- Joint Airpower Competence Center, is a NATO Center of Excellence, whose objective is to provide key decision-makers with effective solutions on air and space power challenges.  The Center often hosts interactive forums enabling delegates from around the world to exchange and share ideas and perspectives on related topics.  Attendees can include senior military, political, industry and academic leaders.  

 

Brig. General (Ret.) Segoli's presentations were about air power and the asymmetric conflict.

 

Two lecturers who spoke prior to Segoli presented a book summarizing their research work on the five air forces in the organization. This particular lecture was subdivided into two parts: the first dealing with general air force power and the second focused on the Turkish Air Force.

 

Without any pre-coordination, a number of the subjects covered by these two lecturers were the very same subjects that Segoli planned to raise in his lecture, i.e. the over-dependence of air power on advanced technology at the expense of creative solutions.

 

Present at the first presentation were representatives from different air forces that the organization services. The second presentation hosted a larger group primarily comprised of air force representatives who serve at the research institute.

 

Segoli's lectures covered the following crucial points:

 

* Countries cannot allow ourselves to continue to engage in asymmetric conflicts without clearer results, as has happened to date (with us and others.) The goal must be to achieve the clearest possible result.

* As much as we want to achieve the goal fighting "stand-off" with minimal friction, we are not there yet

* At the opposite end of the spectrum, there is the massive use of ground forces with the aim of gaining control of territory and suppression of the enemy.  Based on Israel's and other country's experiences, this will invariably lead to further complications, a drastic revision of the operation's goals, and in the end, the battle is dramatically lengthened without any guarantee that victory will be achieved.

* Between these two spectrums lies a large space where new, creative thinking of combined use of force is required.  It is this range that must be further investigated.

 

These presentations took place shortly after Operation Protective Edge in Gaza, and just as the campaign against ISIS was just getting underway. 

 

Besides the opportunity to present our ideas to professionals from other air forces we established relationship with this important NATO institute and in our next annual conference which will be held in May 27th we will have an their representative as a lecturer.

 

הקטע של עדו הכט לא שייך לעניין. אין בו צורך 

 

To help frame the situation in a clearer light, we quote from Dr. Eran Hecht on the readiness of NATO's air force:

 

"The frightening achievements and slaughter of ISIS triggered cries from Europe to intervene on behalf of those battling ISIS by either providing direct military aid (air strikes) or by provided weapons and aid.  Prior to that, the European nations were asked to consider the type of aid that they would provide the Ukraine during the civil warfare.  Three years ago, the Europeans decided to assist the rebels in battle against Khaddafi in Libya.  The European response in all three cases was weak at best. In Libya, British, French and Italian planes struck -- but they soon discovered that they were only able to do that because the Americans provided support, including fueling in mid-air.  In the Ukraine, the Europeans sent some money and imposed sanctions on Russia, but the most blatant military action was the dispatching of 4000 soldiers from European armies in one fell swoop. From 2001 until today, most of the NATO nations are engaged in a military campaign in Afghanistan and it is clear that most of them are having difficulty keeping more than one or two platoons, and one or two squadrons for more than one or two seasons. The accompanying article explains the reasons for this -- a warped picture of Europe's military readiness as a result of insufficient funds and faulty management.  A document that was leaked from the German Security Department documents that only 8% of advanced fighter planes, 11% of the heavy transport helicopters, 10% of the medium-sized transport planes, and 38% of the double engine transport planes are perfectly operational!.  According to the document, the only fit armies, and they have their limitations, are the French and British Armies." 

Jump to page content